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The relationship between rights carefully carved into a written constitution and the 
observance of these rights is a much examined question. An obvious and immediate 
response is that in many countries there is little relationship between the words and 
political reality. This gap is explained by political factors, socio-economic expectations 
and cultural differences. The intent of this paper is not to replicate or reiterate these 
factors as possible explanations for perceived rights protection failures. Rather, the goal 
is to offer another factor for consideration -  that written constitutions have different 
purposes in different states. A principal role associated with the written constitution in 
North America -  civil and political rights protection -  is not necessarily of the same 
significance for constitutions in other countries, even for those constitutions with 
similar human rights language. Such constitutional language may exist for different 
purposes and be intended to have different effects.
The goal of this contribution is to provide an overview of the principal 
constitutional documents of four Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia,1 Indonesia,2 
Thailand3 and Vietnam,4 focusing on the human rights content of these constitutions, 
and to examine the “role” played by the written constitutions in the different countries
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as a way of explaining the perceived gap between constitutional text and human rights 
observance.
Written Constitutions Versus Constitutionalism
Simply put, a constitution is a document that sets down a series of rules designed to 
govern state activities.5 Complementing, amending and extending formal constitutional 
documents are such things as constitutional customs, constitutional conventions, 
ordinary statute laws with constitutional significance and judicial precedent which 
interprets written constitutions and these other sources. Together, these elements 
regulate the exercise of political power within the public sphere. While the particular 
mix of these different elements will vary from country to country, a complete canvass 
of a country’s constitutional structure would consider them all. Canada, for instance, 
provides an example of a complex constitutional structure. A reading of the Canadian 
constitutional acts6 in isolation would lead to the belief that the Governor-General is the 
most powerful individual in the country, a situation which once Canadian political 
convention is understood, clearly is not the case.7 So, too, the existence of political 
parties, of cabinet government, and even of responsible government (a cornerstone of 
the parliamentary tradition) are not recognized in Canada’s written constitution. Yet 
all lie at the centre of Canada’s true constitutional government, their existence rooted 
firmly in constitutional convention. Furthermore, although it was only in 1982, with 
the enactment of the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms,8 that Canada formally 
included expansive political and civil rights protection within its written constitution, 
it would be false to suggest that, prior to 1982, legal and political rights had no 
protection or acceptance within Canada. In fact, constitutional jurisprudence, statutory 
law and constitutional practice provided significant recognition and protection of these 
rights prior to 1982.9
The emphasis in this contribution, however, will be on the written constitution as 
opposed to the conventional, judicial, or political constitutionalism that may exist within 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. Admittedly, there is a danger in putting 
too much emphasis on a written constitution, since such a document may reflect little 
of the true situation within a country. This may be because of additional legal, political
5J. Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) at 5-7; K.C. 
Wheare, Modern Constitutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) at 1-2.
hThe Constitution Act, 1867, The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B ,, U.K. Statutes, 1982, c. 11.
7The Constitution Act, 1867 vests general executive authority for Canada in “the Queen” and confers a number 
of specific powers on a “Governor-General.” However, by convention, both the Queen and her representative 
in Canada, the Governor-General, act upon the advice of the federal cabinet.
sCanada Act 1982, Part 2, Schedule B.
9In the strictly legal context, this is discussed by P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1997 Student Edition) at 604-609.
and conventional elements that are essential parts of a state’s constitutional structure. 
It may also be because constitutions can be, in practice, irrelevant to a state’s actual 
governance. A written constitution no more guarantees constitutional rule than the 
absence of a formal document designated as the constitution indicates the absence of 
a constitutional framework.10 Constitutional documents may have little to do with the 
real character of state institutions in a country, operating, instead, as “camouflage 
constitutions”.11
Nevertheless, a written constitution frequently is the most important legal document 
in a state and usually is the cornerstone of the public law sector of a legal system. There 
is an international expectation that an independent state will have a formal, 
documentary constitution and the term “constitution” most commonly designates this 
narrower, textual element of a state’s constitutional structure.12 Beyond this external 
factor, governments establish written constitutions in order to legitimize their actions 
and status in the eyes of their domestic populations. Indeed, even in those states where 
the written constitution appears largely incongruent with the real structures of the state, 
the written constitution may still feature significantly in the state’s political life.13 Thus, 
while undue emphasis cannot be placed on written constitutions, particularly as regards 
the exercise of political power, documentary constitutions are important indicators of 
a state’s legal and political culture.
The establishment of constitutions by those with political power is a purposeful 
action engineered to bring about particular results. A constitution may be enacted to 
ensure political stability, the legitimacy of a particular group, a certain mix of individual 
freedom and regulatory power or a specific economic system. It is most frequently true 
that the enactment of a new constitution marks the desire of a state’s political elite to 
make a “fresh start” -  to re-structure the existing state and begin again with a new or 
at least a modified state structure.14
Written constitutions are characterized by distinct features, which separate 
constitutional rules from other categories of legal rules or laws. Constitutions set out 
citizen rights and public competences.15 Specifically, the contents of written 
constitutions fall into four categories: rules establishing the nature of the state; rules 
setting out the rights of individuals; rules elaborating the powers of the state; and rules
l0Lane, supra note 5 at 8.
"Ibid. at 119.
l2Indeed, only a few countries do not have a special document designated as their constitutions. The United 
Kingdom, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are some examples of those countries which lack such a document. Lane, 
supra note 5 at 6.
' ’Lane, supra note 5 at 124.
l4Wheare, supra note 5 at 6.
setting out the process for amending the constitution.16 The first category of rules 
concerns whether the state is unitary or federal. The second and third categories — rules 
which elaborate state powers and individual rights — have to do with the internal and 
external boundaries of state power.*7 The last category -  rules which govern the process 
for constitutional change — is concerned with constitutional continuity and stability. 
Rules which ensure the exceptional nature of constitutional change preserve what Lane 
has termed “constitutional inertia” which is, in turn, a guarantee that the constitution 
will retain its formal status as the superior law.18 Not all constitutions have rules 
conforming to all of these categories but most do.19
The focus in this paper will be on those aspects of the examined constitutions which 
have, as their objective, the limitation of the exercise of state power in relation to 
individual citizens. More than any other area of constitutional representation of a 
state’s political and legal structure, written guarantees of rights can be deceptive. 
Declarations of rights are meaningless if the state is determined to ignore them and, 
arguably, unnecessary if the state is committed to their observance. Yet, almost all 
written constitutions list protected rights. Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and, to a much 
lesser extent, Indonesia are no exceptions; each has a documentary constitution which 
articulates protected human rights.
The Emphasis on Civil and Political Rights
The starting place for constitutional recognition of human rights lies with civil and 
political rights, a category that includes rights of expression, religion, association and 
the freedom from arbitrary arrest. Such rights are termed first generation rights, a label 
which denotes their primary place in the development of rights theory. Traditional 
understandings of these rights identify the state and the collective power it wields as the 
greatest threat to the interests protected by these rights. The traditional viewpoint is that
u’Lane, supra note 5 at 110.
l7The use of the term “internal” is meant to indicate the balancing of power between the various organs -  the 
legislative, executive and judicial -  of the state itself. Reference to “external” boundaries signifies the limits 
of state power in the relationships the state has with the individual. Lane, supra note 5 at 125.
l8Lane, supra note 5 at 114.
l9For instance, the Constitution of New Zealand is one of the few constitutions in the world which lacks 
extraordinary procedures for consitutional amendment and, therefore, can be amended by ordinary legislative 
process.
such rights exist to be asserted against governments and governmental organs.20 Here, 
the role of a constitution in limiting state power is most strongly evident.
However, notions of the interests protected by rights have evolved significantly, as 
has the understanding of the positive role the state must play in protecting even political 
and civil rights.21 Recent constitutional documents reflect this evolution.22 Human 
rights now protected in various rights documents include socio-economic rights, such 
as rights to health care, food, education and housing. These rights rest upon an 
increasingly sophisticated understanding of state power. The state is viewed not only 
as a source of coercive limitation of individual freedom but also as an active and 
positive participant in the attainment of rights.
The differences between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social and 
economic rights, on the other, have resulted in different expectations about state 
obligations in relation to each type of right.23 Generally, state obligations in relation to 
civil and political rights are held to be of immediate and full application. This is not the 
case with respect to social and economic rights, where the notion of progressive 
achievement often informs what is required of the state.24 Different expectations arise 
from the reality that full attainment of social and economic rights may demand more 
resources than a state has available. In this way, then, economic and social rights exist 
primarily as standards which the state undertakes to promote and to achieve 
progressively.25
20J. Waldron, Nonsense on Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights o f  Man, (London: Methuen, 1987). 
The philosophical foundations to this understanding have their main roots in the liberal democratic tradition 
of Western Europe, itself heir to “Greek philosophy, Roman law, the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the 
Humanism of the Reformation and the Age of Reason.” A.H. Robertson, revised by J.G. Merrills, Human 
Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study o f  the International Protection o f  Human Rights, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) at 3.
21For discussion of this latter point, see Waldron, supra note 20 at 157: “So it is not true to say that the 
traditional liberal rights require from governments nothing more than omissions whereas modem socio­
economic rights involve costs. All rights-even rights to liberty-are costly to uphold.”
22See, for example, sections 26,27 and 29 in the South African Constitution (The Constitution o f  the Republic 
o f  South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996).
23A concrete illustration of the common acceptance of such differences is the decision of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations that there should be separate Covenants dealing with the two types of rights: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976, reprinted in (1967), 6 International Legal Materials 368 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, done 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, reprinted 
in (1967), 6 International Legal Materials 360.
24For a brief discussion of the standard understanding of this difference, see T. Buergental, International 
Human Rights in a Nutshell, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1995) at 53-55.
25For a discussion of this in relation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 
23 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 23, see A.H. 
Robertson, supra note 20 at 230.
It has been argued that the gap between the written constitution and observance of 
civil and political rights arises for different reasons than the gap between the written 
constitution and the attainment of socio-economic human rights goals. Clearly, failure 
to observe either set of rights is often due to a lack of political will to redistribute 
political and material resources. However, the additional possibility exists, at least in 
the case of more impoverished states, that a failure to observe constitutionally mandated 
socio-economic rights may be a product of inadequate resources. This distinction does 
bear on the descriptive focus of the sections in this paper which deal with the 
constitutions of the four examined states but it is enough, for our present purpose, to 
focus on civil and political rights as the most straightforward illustration of the gap 
between written constitutions and their corresponding practical constitutional regimes.
The Four States: Constitutional History and Human Rights
Introduction: Shaping Factors
The four states to be examined in this contribution have different political and cultural 
histories which shape the relationship between the written constitutional documents and 
the political/social realities within each state.
Colonial Influences26
Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam were political and economic colonies of European 
nations, whereas Thailand remained free from direct colonial rule. Cambodia and 
Vietnam, as overseas possessions of France, had French law applied directly to them.27 
While Dutch law applied in Indonesia, the Dutch recognized the existence of indigenous 
law (adat) and respected and encouraged its existence within the colony.28 To avoid 
colonization, Thailand adopted and adapted its legal system through a process that drew
2(There are a number of excellent political and social histories of Southeast Asia which describe and analyze 
in detail the colonial influences on the region. A readable introductory text is J.H. Esterline and M.H. 
Esterline, 'How the Dominoes Fell’: Southeast Asia in Perspective (Lanham, Maryland: Hamilton Press, 
1991). For Vietnam, see pp. 15-65; Cambodia, see pp. 67-103; Thailand, see pp. 239-271; and Indonesia, see 
pp. 273-314.
27See generally M.B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History o f  South-East Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978)
at 153-183.
upon French, German and British law, in addition to indigenous sensibilities.29 Thus, the 
colonial legal legacy is different for each of the four Southeast Asian states.
Moreover, Vietnam and Indonesia have documentary constitutions rooted in post- 
1945 wars of independence from their European colonizers. Cambodia’s constitutional 
roots are also in the post-1945 years, although the path to independence was negotiated 
rather than achieved through force of arms. Thailand’s written constitution arose from 
the internal overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. Generally, Cambodia, 
Indonesia and Vietnam had their constitutional histories shaped by the struggle against 
foreign interests, whereas Thailand’s constitutional history has been shaped principally 
by internal factors.
National Unity and Religion
In comparison with many other nation states, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are 
relatively homogenous in socio-cultural and linguistic terms. The vast majority of the 
population in each of these states shares a single religion, language and cultural heritage. 
Of course, this is not uniform. Thailand, for example, has a well-defined Muslim 
minority in its southern provinces.30 Moreover, both Thailand and Vietnam have large 
Chinese populations although, in Thailand, the integration of the Sino-origin population 
is more marked.31 The Buddhist religion common to the three countries has not had a 
profound impact on the day-to-day political struggles or constitutional structures of the 
states, although the role of Buddhism in legitimation of power, law and order, and societal 
relations is a defining characteristic of the three countries.32
:,The legal history of Thailand is complicated because of this legal borrowing and because of Thailand’s non­
colonial position. Concerning the “modernization” of Thai law in the 1900s and the influence o f non-Thais 
on this process, see: Thailand Official Yearbook-1968 (Bangkok: Government ofThailand, 1968) at 254-258; 
Hooker, supra note 27 at 183-185 and more generally A. Petchsiri, Eastern Importation o f  Western Criminal 
Law: Thailand as a Case Study (Littleton, Colo.: Rothman & Co. 1987).
■°See generally C.F. Keyes, Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modem Nation-State (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1987) at 131-132.
11 See D.K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History’ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) at 292 and Keyes, 
supra note 30 at 133-135. The Chinese-origin population in Thailand is further described in several 
contributions in D. Chirot and A. Reid, eds., Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern 
Transformation o f  Southeast Asia and Central Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). More 
generally, on the Chinese-origin population in Southeast Asia, see L.Y.C. Lim and L.A.P. Gosling, eds., The 
Chinese in Southeast Asia (2 Volumes) (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1983).
^Buddhism in Thailand is the state religion and identified by some as an essential characteristic of being Thai. 
See K. Hewison, “Of Regimes, State and Pluralities: Thai Politics Enters the 1990s” in K. Hewison, et a l, 
eds., Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy & Capitalism (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen 
and Unwin, 1993) at 180-181. More generally, see Somboon Suksamran, “Buddhism, Political Authority, and 
Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia” in T. Ling, ed., Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993) at 101-153.
By contrast, Indonesia is country of many differing linguistic and cultural groups 
dominated by the Javanese.33 Government-mandating of an official language was seen 
as necessary.34 Moreover, although Islam is the predominant religion, views differ on 
the efficacy of adopting Islamic Law as national law, particularly with respect to its 
application to the public sector. As a consequence, there is a constant friction between 
theocracy and secular legal domains which has significant implications on political and 
societal stability within Indonesia.35 Not surprisingly the central concern of constitution- 
makers in Indonesia has been the establishment and maintenance of a unified state.
Military, Civilian Rule and Democracy36
None of the four countries is currently gripped by a “classic” military dictatorship. None 
of the four written constitutions specifically directs that there is to be a political role for 
the military. However, in all four countries there is a tension — sometimes overt, 
sometimes subtle — between military and civilian rule.37
Cambodia has an elected civilian government.38 The civilian, dual leadership 
coalition which emerged from the 1993 elections broke down in 1997 when Hun Sen 
relied on force to consolidate power.39 The relationship between the military and the 
Cambodian civilian government is still evolving but the continuing internal security threat 
from the Khmer Rouge and opposition to the consolidation provides the military with 
political paramountcy.
"See generally R.W. Liddle, “Politics and Culture in Indonesia” in R.W. Liddle, ed., Leadership and Culture 
in Indonesian Politics (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996) at 63-106.
MIbid. at 66-68.
"The intersection o f Islam and political change in Indonesia is discussed in M.R.J. Vatikiotis, Political 
Change in Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 1996) at 137-158 and 163-166.
,6The meaning and application of democracy in Southeast Asia as opposed to the Western world has been a 
topic of intense debate. An introduction to the discussion is provided by Vatikiotis, supra note 35 at 82-108 
and A. Laothamatas, “Development and Democratization: A Theoretical Introduction with Reference to the 
Southeast Asian and East Asian Cases”, in A. Laothamatas, ed., Democratization in Southeast and East Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997) at 1-20.
,7This is a complex topic which has been examined carefully by observers of the four countries. A good, 
although dated, overview is provided in Z.H. Ahmad and H. Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in 
South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).
3SRespecting the 1993 election in Cambodia, see the excellent article by K.G. Frieson, “The Cambodian
Elections of 1993: A Case of Power to the People”, in R.H. Taylor, ed., The Politics o f  Elections in Southeast
Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 224-242.
19See generally Abdul Gaffar Peang-Meth, “Understanding Cambodia’s Political Developments” (1997) 19
Contemporary’ Southeast Asia at 286-308.
In Thailand, the military has long been an important political actor, convinced of its 
own role as the ultimate protector, both internally and externally, of the Thai state.40 
However, the Thai military has been uneasy with direct rule, preferring to exercise 
influence on compliant elected civil governments.41 The 1997 Constitution o f  Thailand 
specifically diminishes the formal ways in which the military can influence the civilian 
government.
In Vietnam, there is a civilian government but the role of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party is paramount42 and the relationship between the Party and the military is close, 
although veiled.43 In Indonesia, the military plays a direct role in almost all government 
structures and it is asserted that the Indonesian military has a dual role as state defender 
and as a socio-economic force (dwijungsi).44 The electoral process in Vietnam is 
designed to ensure no surprises in the one-party state.45 Elections for the civilian leaders 
in Indonesia involve complex management and tight controls such that expectations are 
met.46
It would be unfair to say, without qualification, that in all four states the military is 
unaccountable to the civilian government and, therefore, uncontrolled. However, in all 
four states, the civilian governments are either highly integrated with the military or 
civilian government control over the military must be exercised with a deft hand.
40An articulation of this view in an historical context is provided by J.L.S. Girling, Thailand: Society and 
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981) at 119-186 and Suchit Bunbongkam, “Political 
Institutions and Processes” in Somsakdi Xuto, ed., Government and Politics o f  Thailand (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) at 42-58.
“"Respecting elections in Thailand, see Suchit Bunbongkam, “Elections and Democratization in Thailand”, 
in Taylor, supra note 38 at 184-200 and A. Laothamatas, “A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting 
Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand”, in Taylor, supra note 38 at 201-223.
42There is an extensive literature on the Vietnamese Communist Party. A good overview is provided by G. 
Porter, Vietnam: The Politics o f  Bureaucratic Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) at 64-87. 
A recent look at the V.C.P. is provided by Taveepom Vasavakul, “Vietnam: The Third Wave of State 
Building” (1997) Southeast Asian Affairs 337 at 338-341.
41See H.C. Hebbel, “The Vietnamese Military’s Changing Role” [1993] Southeast Asian Affairs 364-372.
44A convenient introduction to the dual role of the military in Indonesia (dwijungsi) is provided by R.W.
Liddle, “Suharto’s Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions” in Liddle, supra note 33 at 28-30. See
also Ngandani, “Leadership and Security in Indonesia: The Institutional Role of ABRI” in S. Chee, ed., 
Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991) at 26-52. 
For a recent analysis of the military in Indonesia, see J. B. Haseman, “Indonesia and ABRI: Challenges to the 
Future” (1997) Southeast Asian Affairs at 27-140.
45The 1992 elections in Vietnam are discussed in C.A. Thayer, “Recent Political Development: Constitutional 
Change and the 1992 Elections” in C.A. Thayer and D.G. Marr, eds., Vietnam and the Rule o f  Law (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1993) at 55-74.
46See R.W. Liddle, “A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia” in Taylor, supra 
note 38 at 34-60. See also: A. Santoso, “Democratization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order”, in 
Laothamatas, supra note 36 at 21-45.
Constitutional History
Since the end o f the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has had sixteen written 
constitutions. The most recent is that of October 1997. These numerous constitutions 
must be correlated with thirteen successful military coups, the most recent in February 
1991, and twenty-one elections, the most recent in 1996. This long relationship between 
constitutions, coups and elections has been described as the cycle of Thai politics: a 
military coup suspends the old constitution; a new constitution is proclaimed; elections 
are held; time passes until a perceived crisis leads to another military coup.48 The 1997 
Constitution, which replaces the 1991 Constitution, appears to be a break from this 
pattern since its adoption did not directly follow a coup. However, the better view is that 
the 1997 Constitution is simply a reverberation from the 1991 coup.
Except for the 1991 military coup, which might best be seen as a political hiccup, 
Thailand has, since 1978, had a relatively stable written constitution and a civilian-led 
government which has evolved into Thai-style democracy.49 Political and government 
stability in Thailand has been enhanced by the role of the much-revered monarch, King 
Bhumibol. The King’s role in political and social cohesion is more significant in practice 
than that ascribed to the Monarchy by the written constitutions where his role is described 
as only that of a constitutional monarch.50
The transitory nature of Thailand’s written constitutions must be contrasted with the 
underlying consistency of certain principles that are constitutional in nature. These 
include the role of the Monarchy, the existence of civilian government, the independence
47This section draws from T.L. McDorman, “The 1991 Constitution of Thailand” (1995) 3 Pac. Rim L. & 
Pol’y J. (University o f Washington) 257-298 and T.L. McDorman, “Constitutional Change and Continuity 
in Thailand in the Aftermath of the 1991 Coup” in G.A. Ferguson and D.M. Johnston, eds., Asia-Pacific 
Trends in Legal Development: Sectoral and Cross-Sectoral Studies (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press) (in press).
48See Chai-anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy” in L. Diamond, et al., eds., Democracy 
in Developing Countries: Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989) at 336 and Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi- 
Democracy: The Evolution o f  the Thai Political System (Singapore: Time Academic Publishing, 1992) at 147.
49Thai-style democracy is discussed in many of the political studies of Thailand. A recent analysis is provided 
by Surin Maisrikrod, “The Making of Thai Democracy: A Study of Political Alliances Among the State, the 
Capitalists and the Middle Class”, in Laothamatas, supra note 36 at 141-166.
50The political and institutional role of the Monarchy is succinctly noted in Bunbongkam, supra note 40 at 
58-60. The unique character of King Bhumibol Adulyadej is described in R. Tasker, “Sovereign Guide” (13 
June 1996) Far Eastern Economic Review at 20-21 and M. Vatikiotis and G. Fairclough, “Advice and 
Consent” ( 13 June 1996) Far Eastern Economic Review at 21 -22.
of the judiciary and the lack of large-scale social, economic, religious or political 
repression.51
Constitutional Human Rights
The 1997 Constitution o f  Thailand, like most of that country’s recent written 
constitutions, establishes the well-recognized catalogue of political-legal human rights: 
equal protection of the law; freedom from arbitrary arrest; freedom of speech and 
association; and the right to property.
In previous Thai constitutions, the scope of the protection offered by these rights was 
hedged by a number of factors. Many rights were qualified by the caveat that a right 
existed only to the extent that the right was not restricted by other laws. Thus 
constitutional rights were to yield in the face of conflicting legislation. A more general 
limitation was that individual rights were not to be exercised “against the country, 
religion, the King, and the Constitution.” Finally, there was no direct avenue for judicial 
review of rights abuses which arose from alleged governmental breaches of the 
Constitution. All cases which raised constitutional issues were to be reviewed by a ten- 
member Constitutional Tribunal composed of senior legal and political officials.
The 1997 Thai Constitution is acknowledged as having expanded both the scope of 
individual rights protected and the manner in which those rights are to be protected. 
Article 29 provides that constitutional liberties are to be restricted only by laws consistent 
with the Constitution, thus replacing the more wide-open approach of previous 
constitutions. The 1997 Constitution expressly allows citizens to bring their cases to any 
Thai court when liberties allegedly have been infringed by the government. Indeed, the 
1997 Constitution appears to create a constitutional judicial review authority in Thai 
courts although the courts have yet to assume this role. Moreover, the 1997 Thai 
Constitution creates a National Human Rights Commission with a mandate to monitor 
human rights violations and report regularly to Parliament. One commentary concluded 
that the 1997 Constitution “gives more to the people than any other charter in Thai 
history.”52
5lThese underlying principles of Thai constitutionalism are discussed in detail in McDorman, “Constitutional 
Change and Continuity in Thailand”, supra note 47. In this context, it is also of interest that the global history 
of constitutional change is far more dynamic than the experiences of Canada and the United States would 
indicate. Indeed, according to Lane, supra note 5 at 158, “[constitutional longevity is more of an illusion than 
a real phenomenon.”
52Thongbai Thongpao, “Charter promotes rights”, Bangkok Post (Daily) (12 October 1997) at 7.
Constitutional History
Since Vietnam’s declared independence in 1945, there have been four written 
constitutions, the most recent of which is that of 1992. A review of Vietnam’s experience 
with constitutional change must take into account socialist ideology and the perceived 
role of constitutions in a socialist legal system.
As articulated by one observer, constitutions in a socialist legal framework “are not 
intended to serve as permanent documents reflecting the timeless political and 
philosophical values of a given society.”54 They do not seek to regulate relations between 
state and society, nor do they have a determinative legal function. The primary purpose 
of a constitution in a socialist state is “to chart the progress of the society as it evolves 
through stages of growth to a final state of classless communism.”55 At each stage of 
revolution, a new constitution is developed to establish the policies of that stage, to 
motivate the populace and to set forth the objectives to be achieved in preparation for the 
next stage. It is not surprising, therefore, that “stability in the Constitution and 
unconditional adherence to its provisions are ... not considered necessary, or even 
desirable, goals.”56
Vietnam’s 1992 Constitution is an attempt to implement free-market economic 
reform without upsetting the political domination of the Communist Party of Vietnam. 
The need for economic renovation in the face of poverty conditions, a demand for foreign 
investment and Vietnam’s desire to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) were clearly the motivations for the constitutional change.
Constitutional Human Rights
Article 2 proclaims that the Vietnamese state “is of the people, by the people, and for the 
people” and that “(a)ll state power belongs to the people based on the worker-peasant- 
intellectual alliance.” Chapter V contains the fundamental rights and duties of the citizens 
of Vietnam and the relationship between rights and duties is manifested in Article 51 
which reads:
-This section draws from J. Harrington, T.L. McDorman & W.A.W. Neilson, “The 1992 Vietnamese 
Constitution: Economic Reform, Political Continuity” in Ferguson and Johnston, supra note 47.
54W.J. Duiker. “The Constitutional System of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”, in L.W. Beer, ed., 
Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia (Seattle: University of Washington, 1992) at 331.
f}Ibid.
5AM. Beresford, Vietnam: Politics, Economics and Society (New York: Pinter, 1988) at 98-99.
Citizens’ rights are not separated from their duties. The state guarantees all citizens’ 
rights. Citizens must fulfill their obligations to the state and society.
The catalogue of political-legal rights in the 1992 Vietnamese Constitution includes 
most of the familiar rights such as speech, association, religion, due process, freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and equality. Many of these rights are qualified in that the right 
exists “as prescribed or stipulated by law.” In other words, legislation or regulation can 
delineate the right. Such legislation or regulation is not constitutionally inconsistent since 
the right specifically includes the ability of the state to limit the scope of the right.
As Article 51 directs, “the state guarantees human rights.” In undertaking this duty, 
the state also determines the content of rights and the ability to assert rights against the 
state apparatus. It is important to recognize that, unlike in Thailand where courts have 
a tradition of independence,57 in Vietnam the separation of the judiciary from the 
executive and legislative branches of government is not recognized. Thus judicial 
protection or enforcement of constitutional human rights against the government cannot 
be expected.58
Indonesia
Constitutional History59
Like Vietnam, Indonesia traces its constitutional history to a declared independence in 
1945, when a brief constitution was promulgated. Indonesian independence solidified 
only in 1949 with the creation of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and a new 
federalist constitution. Soon afterward, the Federation crumbled and was replaced in 
1950 by the Republic of Indonesia. The new Republic had a Provisional Constitution 
which remained in place until 1959. The Provisional Constitution required the creation 
of a Constituent Assembly (Konstituante) which would be charged with drafting a new 
constitution. Established in 1956, the Constituent Assembly failed to discharge its 
mandate.
The new constitution appeared to be an impossible task, given the unbridgeable 
differences between the Islamic faction and nationalist, communist and other small
"Judicial independence in Thailand is discussed in McDorman, “The 1991 Constitution of Thailand”, supra 
note 47, at 285-288 and McDorman, “Constitutional Change and Continuity”, supra note 47.
58See Duiker, supra note 54 at 347; B.K. Chi, “The Role of Law in Vietnam [1994] Asia-Pacific 
Constitutional Yearbook 254 at 260-261; and P. Nicholson and P.N. Toan, “Vietnam” [1995] Asia-Pacific 
Constitutional Yearbook 335-344.
’’Indonesia’s tangled constitutional history is set out clearly in M. Solly Lubis, “Indonesian Constitutional 
Law” in C.V. Sison, ed.. Constitutional and Legal Systems o f  ASEAN Countries (Manila: University o f the 
Philippines, 1990) at 45-52.
factions. Each faction stubbornly insisted on its own draft and refused to compromise.
The Islamic faction wanted a state based on Islamic Law, while the others rejected such 
an idea outright. The Konstituante was forced into a deadlock which created even 
stronger discontent.60
In the face of deadlock and political instability, President Sukarno dissolved the 
Assembly and, by unilateral decree, reactivated the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 
Constitution has remained in place since that time, a fact that gives it a constitutional 
longevity surpassed in East Asia only by the American-drafted Constitution of Japan.
Three central features of the 1945 Constitution can be identified. First, the document 
is skeletal; it contains only 37 articles which are directed to the most basic aspects of 
governance. Second, the governing structure is one that gives the central government’s 
executive predominant authority. Third, the manner in which the Constitution applies — 
in which government authority is to be exercised — is directed by the guiding philosophy 
set out in the preamble to the Constitution. This third feature, the Indonesian state 
philosophy, termed Pancasila, has five principles:61
• Belief in the One Supreme God;
A just and civilized humanity (humanitarianism);
• Indonesia should be a unified state (nationalism);
• The state should be based on the sovereignty of the People (democracy guided by 
consensus); and
• The state should strive for social justice.
Pancasila Democracy is the description used for the governing system. It has been 
characterized as the “antithesis of Western Democracy” because it denies that voting is 
key to the decision-making process.62
Constitutional Human Rights
Compared to the written constitutions of Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, the 1945 
Indonesian Constitution is relatively barren of provisions which deal explicitly with 
human rights. Only six provisions deal with human rights issues. These cover freedom
“ T.M. Lubis, In Search o f  Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas o f  Indonesia’s New Order, 1966-1990 
(Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1993) at 62.
61 Pancasila is described in detail in P. Wahjono, “Republic of Indonesia: Democracy in Indonesia -  Pancasila 
Democracy” in Beer, supra note 54 at 462-506.
62S. Arinanto, “Indonesia: Democratization of Constitutional and Political Life” (1993) Asia-Pacific
Constitutional Yearbook 55 at 58.
of assembly, speech, the press and religion. They also cover the rights to work, to 
education and to equality before the law. While the 1945 Constitution is silent with 
respect to independence of the judiciary and the courts’ role in dealing with human rights, 
the elucidation or official explanation of the Constitution indicates that judicial authority 
is to be independent of government influence.63
The unwillingness to detail rights further in the 1945 Constitution is attributed to the 
reservations held by Indonesian leaders that “the notion of the universality of rights ... 
might lead to individualism and liberalism”.64 In both 1945 and 1959 the central purpose 
of the written constitution was achievement and preservation of national unity. The 
projected ideology was that the state was the guardian of the people. The “overall well­
being of the people” is the state’s priority and this priority encompasses, or subsumes, 
individual rights. As one author has commented, “Indonesian integralism thus provides 
a foundation for the state which is different from and, in fact, established in opposition 
to foundations based on individualism or totalitarianism.”65
Cambodia
Constitutional History
Prior to adoption of the 1993 Constitution, Cambodia had generated six different 
documentary constitutions.66 The first arose, in 1947, from a joint Cambodian-French 
commission and received ratification by an elected constituent assembly. With 
Cambodia’s independence, achieved in 1954, Prince Sihanouk engineered constitutional 
change, in 1956, to enhance his own authority. The monarchy came to an end in 1970 
and a republican constitution was proclaimed in 1972. Despite the devastation caused by 
the Khmer Rouge, a new constitution was adopted for Democratic Kampuchea in 1976. 
The removal of the Khmer Rouge and the ensuing political turmoil led to still more 
constitutional change in the 1980s; a new constitution in 1981 and another in 1989 both 
reflected Cambodia’s recent socialist heritage.
In 1993, Cambodia adopted a new constitution as part fulfillment of the expectations 
of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords.67 The 1991 Accords elaborated six principles which
ft1See Lubis, supra note 60 at 96-109. For a recent comment on judicial independence in Indonesia, see Satya 
Arinanto, “Indonesia” ( 1994) Asia-Pacific Constitutional Yearbook 83 at 84-86.
MLubis, supra note 60 at 78 and 82.
65Wahjono, supra note 61 at 464.
M’These constitutions are collected and briefly commented upon in R.M. Jennar, The Cambodian Constitutions 
(1953-1993) (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1995).
67Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and 
National Unity o f  Cambodia, done and entered into force 23 October 1991, reprinted in (1992), 31 
International Legal Materials 200. See generally S.R. Ratner, “The Cambodia Settlement Agreements”
committed Cambodia to a westem-style governmental structure and constitution. As one 
observer noted, “the Paris Accord commits ... [Cambodia] to a constitution that has little 
relationship to recent legal and political practices and traditions in Cambodia.”68 A 
thirteen-member committee of the elected Constituent Assembly worked to draft a 
constitution. Advice and support from the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) was rejected. As William Shawcross reported:
At the end of August UNTAC was finally allowed to see a draft, which appeared to give 
undue power to the chief of state and too little protection to the rights of citizens ....
Also missing were provisions for an independent judiciary and the specific prohibition 
of torture. UNTAC submitted suggestions, and some were accepted.69
The adoption of the Constitution, in September 1993, marked the re-establishment of 
Prince Sihanouk as the Cambodian head of state and the end of the UNTAC mission in 
Cambodia.70
Constitutional Human Rights
One authority has stated that “Cambodians have always been abused by authority”.71 
Reference can be made to the “arbitrary” rule of Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge 
period and the 1980s authoritarian rule. It is not surprising that UNTAC took, as one of 
its primary purposes, the development of knowledge and structures to deal with human 
rights.
Chapter Three of the 1993 Constitution catalogues an impressive list of human rights 
guarantees. These include: equality before the law; the right to vote; the right to life, 
personal freedom and security; equal pay for equal work; the right to strike; rights against 
physical abuse and unwarranted detention; freedom of expression, religion, press, 
publication and assembly; and explicit abolishment of “all forms of discrimination against 
women.” Chapter Nine directs that the judiciary is to be independent and paragraph two 
of Article 109 states, “The Judiciary shall guarantee and uphold impartiality and protect 
the rights and freedoms of citizens”. However, it is the Constitutional Council which has 
the authority to safeguard and interpret the Constitution and to examine the
6SY. Ghai, Some Thoughts on the Cambodian Constitution (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Faculty
of Law Working Paper, 1993) at 5.
69W. Shawcross, Cambodia’s New Deal (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1994) at 32. A slightly different
perspective is provided by T. Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons o f  UNTAC (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995) at 95-97.
70There is a growing literature analyzing and describing the UNTAC mission in Cambodia. See Findlay, supra
note 69 and C. Hughes, UNTAC in Cambodia: The Impact on Human Rights (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1996).
constitutionality of national laws. The relationship between the Constitutional Council 
and the judiciary is not clear.
Human Rights and Written Constitutions
Why Human Rights are in Written Constitutions
There are three obvious reasons why written constitutions contain human rights 
provisions even though it may be beyond the capacity or willingness of a state to adhere 
to such rights provisions. First, there is the external influence of international human 
rights documents such as the Charter o f  the United Nations12 the 1948 Universal 
Declaration o f  Human Rights,13 the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights74 and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,15 
to name only a few of the key multilateral documents. As one Vietnamese law expert 
commented about the human rights provisions of the 1992 Vietnamese Constitution, “we 
can assert that our country, our people and our state really respect human rights and 
respect the Universal Declaration and other conventions on human rights.”76 Not 
surprisingly, the 1993 Cambodian Constitution directs that Cambodia is to:
recognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the covenants and conventions related to 
human rights, women’s and children’s rights.
Second, there is the external influence of other constitutions which contain human 
rights provisions. Examples set by the explicit inclusion of human rights provisions in 
the American and French constitutions of the late 1700s have been followed by many 
states. One study showed that “82 percent of the national constitutions drafted between 
1788 and 1948 and 93 percent of the constitutions drafted between 1949 and 1975 
provided some sort of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”77
Third, traditions within specific countries are consistent with the recognition of 
human rights and, therefore, become reflected in the written constitution. For example, 
many of the human rights provisions within the 1997 Thai Constitution are consistent 
with the practices of the Thai people of tolerance and religious freedom. In the case of
7-The Charter o f  the United Nations was completed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force as of 24 October 
1945. 1 United Nations Treaty Series xvi.
71 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810(1948) at 71.
74Supra note 23.
15Ibid. note 23.
7hN.B. Tanh, “The 1992 Constitution and the Rule o f Law”, in Thayer and Marr, supra note 45 at 106.
77H. van Maarseveen and G. van der Twang, Written Constitutions: A Computerized Comparative Study 
( 1978) 191 -195 cited in M. W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Little Brown and 
Co., 1993) at 245.
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, it has been observed that the composers had been educated 
in Western Europe and were aware of comparative constitutional practices and theories 
which “were then adapted to the Indonesian context in order that they be in line with the 
fundamental convictions of the Indonesian people.”78
The Role o f  Written Constitutions 
Six Primary Purposes
The reasons for inclusion of human rights provisions in written constitutions are easily 
understood. However, there often exists a substantial gap between the statement of the 
right and what takes place in practice. While there is a variance in the severity of human 
rights problems in the four states discussed, in all four states a significant gap does exist.79 
The next part of this article’s discussion is an examination of how one might understand 
such gaps in terms of constitutional objectives.
A written constitution can be seen as a necessary and useful state instrument for a 
number of reasons. First, the primary role of a written constitution may be 
organizational. This role of a constitution has been described as the “charter of 
government.”80 The written constitution can be the legal source of governmental 
structures and institutions which detail division of authorities and questions of by whom 
and how state power is to be exercised. Second, the principal motivation for a written 
constitution may be legitimation of the politically powerful or other interests that exercise 
governmental authority. This role of a constitution has less to do with the actual contents 
of the document. Rather, it relates to the purpose that a constitution is to perform. 
Legitimacy may be particularly relevant in societies where political and economic 
conditions have not yielded a broad consensus and leadership is attained or maintained
7SWahjono, supra note 61 at 462.
79For a pointed summary of current patterns of human rights violations in each of the countries this paper 
considers, see Amnesty International Report 1997 (London: Amnesty International, 1996). Yash Ghai argues
that certain characteristics of the general situation of Asian countries provide a distinctive cast to questions
of human rights observance in the region. Among the features he points to are such things as the “grinding
poverty” of many of the states and the implications of such poverty for realization of both political and 
economic rights, large scale violations of rights in both the state and civil spheres o f society and the impact 
of ethnic conflicts. Y. Ghai, “Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate,” (November 1994) 
Occasional Paper No. 4: Occasional Paper Series, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation’s Center for Asian 
Pacific Affairs, 1994) at 2.
80W.F. Murphy, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy” in D. Greenberg, et. al, eds., 
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993) at 8. See also A.C. Cairns, Charter Versus Federalism: The Dilemmas o f  Constitutional Reform 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992) at 7, who writes of this aspect as establishing 
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without the direct consent of the population.81 Third, the purpose of a written constitution 
may be unification where the document is attempting to impose unity on a diverse people. 
In contrasting developed and developing worlds, Yash Ghai has written:
In the developing countries, constitutions were expected to cany a much heavier burden.
They had to foster a new nationalism, create national unity out of diverse ethnic and 
religious communities, prevent oppression and promote equitable development, 
inculcate habits o f tolerance and democracy, and ensure capacity for administration.82
Fourth, the principal motivation for a written constitution may be ideological. The 
objective is to promulgate a document which sets forth a statement of beliefs and guiding 
principles of the state.83 Fifth, a written documentation may be aspirational, a statement 
of intentions and goals to be achieved rather than an operational document. The 
aspirational aspect may turn a document into “a holy symbol of the people themselves” 
and attain a semi-sacred status.84 The US Constitution is a stunning example of this 
phenomenon. Of course, all written constitutions partake of many or all of these 
considerations to varying degrees.
A sixth purpose is exemplified by the Canadian and American constitutions. Here, 
an essential purpose of the written constitution is to act as a restraint on the authority of 
the governing institutions and their organs.85 From this perspective the constitution stands 
as the “guardian of fundamental rights,”86 constituted as a “citizen’s constitution” that 
regulates the axis of power between the citizen and the state.87 In Canada and the United 
States, it is the courts which measure the action of government against the written 
constitution. Within constitutional orthodoxy, both the governed and the governing 
accept the institution of judicial review because of the courts’ perceived impartiality, the
81A detailed discussion of political legitimacy is beyond the scope of this paper. An insightful analysis in the 
Southeast Asian context is provided by the contributions in M. Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). See, in particular, M. Alagappa, “The Anatomy 
of Legitimacy,” ibid. at 11-30.
S-Y. Ghai, “The Theory of the State in the Third World and the Problem of Constitutionalism” (1991) 6 Conn. 
J. Int’l L. 411 at 416 [emphasis added].
"See the comments, under the subheading Vietnam: Constitutional History, supra, about the role of a 
constitution in a socialist state. Beresford, supra note 56 at 99, commented that socialist constitutions 
inevitably bear “little relation to the actual functioning of the system.” Regarding the Constitution o f  the 
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84Murphy, supra note 80 at 9.
85As one commentator argues, “[t]he American innovation...was the political theory whereby the state was
objectified and thus made a mere instrument of a separate sovereign.” P. Bobbit, “Methods o f Constitutional 
Argument,” (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 449 at 450.
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respect the court has earned, the expertise with which judges carry out their tasks and the 
belief that no other institution is better able to perform the necessary role. The acceptance 
of so central and powerful a role for the courts rests upon faith in the distinction between 
law and politics. While both the Canadian and American constitutions also have 
organization, legitimation, unification and ideological purposes, the aspect of these 
documents concerned with citizens’ rights lends the dominant flavour to popular 
perceptions of the constitutions.88
Application in Southeast Asia
A discussion of human rights in the Asian context would be incomplete without reference 
to the debate over the relevance of human rights discourse to governance issues within 
the region -  the so-called “Asian values” debate.89 The debate centers on the perceived 
assertion by the West of the primacy of human rights in constitutional government. 
Various Asian leaders have argued that human rights are not universal and indivisible. 
Rather, they contend, human rights are relative and are appropriate only for select 
cultures and religions.90 Underlying this viewpoint are a number of concerns: resentment 
of what is perceived to be Western bullying or belittling of “Asian values;” confidence 
in an economic success generated by reliance on a strong, unhampered state;91 suspicion 
that the West’s insistence upon rights observance masks a hidden agenda to slow Asian 
economic growth; bitterness that human rights campaigns are mounted by the region’s 
former colonial powers; and a strong belief that the “global” human rights model 
promoted is a Western one which is unnecessary and ill-suited for Asian societies.92 This 
brief summary of a complex ideological and cultural debate ignores the range of nuance 
in the positions advanced by the participants. It also ignores the variety of groups which, 
from within different Asian nations, support, to varying degrees, recognition of a 
universal human rights agenda. As Yash Ghai points out, ethnic and other minorities 
often occupy inferior positions in relation to the prevailing ruling group, those who 
purportedly speak on behalf of Asian values. Moreover, many intellectuals and the 
growing communities of non-governmental organizations within Asian societies also tend 
to regard human rights in ways more consonant with the universal model. Thus, it may 
be the case that statements made by Asian government leaders which question the validity
8SThe 1982 addition of the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms to Canada’s constitutional texts has made this
point relevant for the Canadian Constitution.
S9The full debate is beyond the scope of this contribution. A convenient overview is provided by Ghai, supra
note 79; A. Dupont, “Is There An ‘Asian Way’?” (1996) 38 Survival 13; D.K. Mauzy, “The Human Rights
and ‘Asian Values’ Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying To Clarify the Key Issues” (1997) 10 Pacific Review 
210.
90Ghai, supra note 79 at 1.
9lIn light of the economic events of 1997, the Asian “economic” way is being tested severely.
’’These concerns are well-summarized by Mauzy, supra, note 89 at 212.
of the West’s human rights priorities are targeted more at an internal, domestic audience 
than at the West itself.93
However, the “Asian values” debate engages a different perspective on the issue of 
human rights in Asian society than is the focus of this paper. The argument addressed 
here is that the gap between formal rights guarantees of the four countries under analysis 
and patterns of actual human rights observance in those countries can be attributed, in 
part, to a difference in roles played by the written constitution in each country. Certainly, 
the documentary constitutions of Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam all have 
components which are organizational, ideological and aspirational and are designed to 
enhance legitimation and unification. However, it can be asserted that the written 
constitutions of the four countries have “principal” purposes. As was previously noted, 
the primary aim of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia was and continues to be 
unification. The principal purpose of the 1992 Vietnam Constitution is ideological. 
Historically, Thailand’s constitutions have been instruments of legitimation,94 although 
the 1997 Constitution may be more important for its organizational components. The 
1993 Cambodia Constitution is primarily organizational since the document’s focus is on 
recreating a governmental structure.
Implications for Human Rights
This last set of observations has implications for expectations about the relevance of 
written constitutional guarantees of human rights. Where a written constitution is 
motivated principally by organization, legitimation, unification, ideological or 
aspirational goals, there is usually little intention that citizens’ rights provisions in the 
document are to have an operational effect, at least in so far as this would mean that the 
rights would be asserted against the government in a manner similar to the Canadian and 
American models. In fact, assertion of constitutional human rights against the 
government may be seen as antithetical to the primary purpose of the constitution. 
Hence, one can anticipate a gap between the written constitutional “guarantees” of human 
rights and the reality of human rights observance.
This gap is further explained where the human rights content of a written constitution 
is motivated by external considerations and expectations since the intended audience is 
outside rather than inside the country. It has already been noted that the reason why 
human rights provisions are found in many written constitutions, including the written 
constitutions of Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, has more to do with 
external expectations than internal considerations.
’’See Ghai, supra note 79 at 1-2.
94See: M.S. Shin, The Constitution o f  Thailand (Washington: Library of Congress, 1981) at 59.
Finally, there is the issue of whether the constitution is understood as emanating from 
“the people” or from elite interests within a state. The restraint factor found in Canadian 
and American constitutional practices is philosophically attributed to the heuristic fiction 
that the governed consent to the authority of the government on the terms laid out in the 
written constitution. Westem-style democracy, and the liberal theory which animates it, 
imbue both the populace and the governing elite with the attitude that the written 
constitution is a document of the governed. In none of the four states under examination 
in this paper, can it be asserted that the written constitution is understood as a document 
of the people, at least in the sense that liberal theory endorses. This is not a question of 
process, since no constitution can ever be drafted by “the people.” Rather it is a question 
of ideology which may be posed as follows: must the legitimacy of a written constitution 
rest on its relationship to the needs, interests and powers of the governed?
As well, the primary purposes of the written constitutions in the four Southeast Asian 
countries indicate that the courts of those countries will not have the same role in 
“constraining” government action as courts play in the Canadian and American 
constitutional systems. Even where courts are independent from the government, as in 
Thailand, it is not expected or even accepted that the judiciary will question directly or 
assess the constitutionality of government action. The primary purpose of the Thai 
Constitution does not contemplate this role for the judiciary. Thus, the mechanism for 
assertion of constitution rights against the government which is relied upon in the 
Canadian and American systems is anathema to the Southeast Asian systems.
The Human Rights Importance o f  Written Constitutions
It is an American conviction that human rights can only be adequately protected when 
they are entrenched in a written constitution. Constitutional practices throughout the 
world, however, dispute this assertion. The United Kingdom, for example, has found it 
possible to protect human rights without the need of a written constitution.95 Moreover, 
even within the United States, the history of African-Americans, amongst others, is a 
reminder that written constitutional bills of rights do not guarantee human rights. This 
is simply to repeat the earlier point that respect for human rights comes not from paper 
but from societal, political and cultural acceptance.
Nevertheless, advocates of constitutional human rights protection argue that rights 
contained in a written constitution provide a standard for governments to reach for and 
to be measured against. It is argued that they can and do serve as rallying cries for larger 
political struggles, as reminders of collective values marked by the absence of state
^Protection of civil and political rights within the British legal system has been dealt with by such vehicles 
as the Habeas Corpus Acts and the Bill o f  Rights o f1689 which guaranteed the right to free elections, freedom 
of speech, the right to bail, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and the right to trial by jury. See A.H. 
Robertson, supra note 20 at 4-5.
observance. However hollow the words, human rights language in a written constitution 
can provide both encouragement and support to the continuing struggle for improvement 
in the human condition.96
Conclusion
Professor Beer has written that “constitutionalism is where national history, custom, 
religion, social values and assumptions about government meet positive law, economic 
force, and power politics”97 and that
it is only in the latter half of this century that most countries in Asia have begun ... the 
autonomous development of a constitutional system which appropriately mingles the 
past and present, the indigenous and the foreign, the traditional and the new, to meet the 
needs of the future.98
He concludes that “[m]odem constitutional traditions in Asia have just begun.”99
Written constitutions are part of these developing constitutional traditions, as are 
constitutionally entrenched human rights. It has been the argument of this contribution 
that the gap between constitutional human rights provisions and the reality of their 
observance may be explained, in part, by the fact that within the four countries examined, 
the written constitutions have as their primary purposes goals such as organization, 
ideology and unification which are inconsistent with, or do not provide encouragement 
for, constitutional human rights protection.
9,’It must be noted that rights remain objects of significant controversy even in those states with comparatively 
strong human rights traditions. For example, the efficacy and desirability of the protection of rights embodied 
in the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms is actively contested by Canadian legal scholars. The 
concerns in this context, however, are not that the legal system ignores the rights that the Constitution 
establishes but that, in various ways, enforcement of rights through judicial review is problematic and
ineffective as a means of attaining social justice. See for example, J. Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights 
and Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); A. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique o f 
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